

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS

Agenda Item: B.4.1.6

INFORMATION PAPER

WP No:81 IFATCA'24

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP)

SUMMARY

This Information Paper presents a report about the activities caried by the ICAO Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP) in 2023 after the Montego Bay (Jamaica) 62nd IFATCA Conference.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. ICAO's work on updating Annexes, PANSs, Manuals, Circulars and Docs or on the development of new ones is provided through the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) which forwards Job Cards (JCs) to the several Panels that were established for this purpose. IFATCA has its own representative in many of these Panels and Working Groups.

1.2. The Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP) is mainly focused on keeping Annex 6 and Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS) up to date with all relevant new developments and to provide advice to other Panels about flight operations and aircraft management. This work is being carried with the support of other Sub-Groups of experts.

1.3. After the 62nd IFATCA 2023 Conference, there have been two meetings, one in Luxemburg from 17th to 21st April, which I attended remotely, and one in Montréal from 2nd to 6th October 2023.

1.4. The following is the list of the items discussed during the 2023 FLTOPSP meetings:

- Runway Safety On-board Technology Implementation
- All Weather Operations related tasks
- Re-structuring and rewrite of PANS-OPS vol. III
- Use of the terminology "authorization", "approval" and "acceptance"
- Helicopter operation related tasks
- Update the Manual on the Implementation of the Security Provisions for Annex 6 (Doc

9811)

- Ramp Inspections
- Use of electronic certificates and other documents
- GADSS EoF
- Remote Towers
- Baro-VNAV
- Amendments to PANS-ATM

- Proposed amendment Annex 6 ERP
- Progress of the RPASTF-I
- GADSS End of Flight (EoF) Proposed amendment to ICAO Doc 10165
- Ramp Inspection
- Volcanic Ash update / Quantitative Volcanic Ash
- GNSS Disruption
- EDTO implementation update
- AAA Use of the terminology "authorization", "approval" and "acceptance"
- AWO All Weather Operations update / PBAOM
- Adequacy of visual aids
- Update on runway definitions developed by the Runway Classification Group
- Harmonization of required length for Approach lighting systems CAT I/II
- 2 NM levelled requirement removal
- Guidance material on the use of Industry Codes of Practice to support safety oversight
- Minor issues in Annex 6
- Ground handling
- Update on COCBO
- Non EDTO Threshold Times more than of 60 minutes
- EMCO Extended Minimum Crew Operation

1.5. This document will report about ATM-affecting topics only. All other material has been reported to the EB and may be consulted upon request.

1.6. All the pictures hereby shown are abstract from the FLTOPSP WPs and do just represent proposal of amendment to existing regulations. Unless specifically stated, they do not represent actual operational and authorized procedures.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1. Remote Tower Operation

2.1.1. Annex 6 and Doc 9976 are written with the assumption that an alternate aerodrome in operational aspects is independent of the destination.

IFALPA identified a need to define the provision of ATS when Aerodrome ATS is being provided to several aerodromes from one location.

2.1.2. IFALPA believed the issue belongs to the compliance-based regulatory environment, where a selected alternate shall be independent of the destination in regard to aerodrome ATS provision, unless contingency procedures are established, allowing access to a runway without delay, should the ATS provision be lost.

2.1.3. The FLTOPSP was thus requested to consider developing minimum statutory standards for flight planning in the Digital ATS (DATS) environment, including a definition of adequate contingency procedures.

2.2. SID and STAR transition

2.2.1. ARINC 424 allows SIDs and STARs to be divided into different parts, named SID/STAR Common Route, SID/STAR Runway Transitions and SID/STAR En-route

transitions. This technique can be used for efficient database coding of SID and STAR procedures.

2.2.2. In some States, SID and/or STAR En-route transitions are also identified and published on charts, even though there is no ICAO definition, nor guidance material for the publication of SID/STAR En-route and SID/STAR Runway Transitions.

2.2.3. This has led to inconsistent publications and naming of procedures examples of which are shown in this paper. States have also used the undefined term "RNAV Transition" in publications to identify procedures which are actually normal STARs or Initial Approach procedures.

2.2.4. The FLTOPSP was introduced to a paper which described the operational concept of SID/STAR Runway and SID/STAR En-Route Transitions, as defined in ARINC 424, while illustrating how it can simplify the way SIDs and STARs are charted and coded in the navigation database.

2.2.5. It also provided a proposal to include definitions for SID/STAR Common route, SID/STAR Runway Transition, SID/STAR En-route Transition and the naming thereof in ICAO.

7. **PROPOSED DEFINITIONS**

Standard instrument arrival (STAR). A designated instrument flight rule (IFR) arrival route linking a significant point, normally on an ATS route, with a point from which a published instrument approach procedure can be commenced.

Note: A STAR includes a common route or point and can include en-route transitions and/or runway transitions as needed.

Standard instrument departure (SID). A designated instrument flight rule (IFR) departure route linking the aerodrome or a specified runway of the aerodrome with a specified significant point, normally on a designated ATS route, at which the en-route phase of a flight commences.

Note: A SID includes a common route or point and can include runway transitions and/or en-route transitions as needed.

STAR Common Route. The part of a STAR between the end of a STAR En-route Transition (if needed) and the start of a STAR Runway Transition (if needed).

STAR En-route Transition. The part of a STAR linking the STAR Common Route to the en-route network.

STAR Runway Transition. The part of a STAR linking the STAR Common Route to a position from which an approach procedure to a specified runway can be commenced.

SID Common Route. The part of a SID between the end of a SID Runway Transition (if needed) and the beginning of a SID En-route Transition (if needed).

SID En-route Transition. The part of a SID linking the SID Common Route to the en-route network.

SID Runway Transition. The part of a SID linking a specified runway to the SID Common Route.

Notes:

- SID or STAR En-route Transitions and SID or STAR Runway Transitions are part of the SID or STAR and not separate entities.
- A SID or STAR Common Route can exist without SID or STAR Runway Transitions and without SID or STAR En-route Transitions. The common route could be the entire SID or STAR.
- The SID or STAR Common Route might only consist of a single point that joins the SID or STAR En-route Transitions and SID or STAR Runway Transitions.
- If a SID or a STAR has one or more SID or STAR Runway Transitions or one or more SID or STAR Enroute Transitions, then the Annex 11 Appendix 3 naming conventions apply to the SID Common Route or STAR Common Route
- SID or STAR Runway Transitions do not require a designator as they are identified by the runway number
- SID En-route Transitions do not require a designator as they are identified by the name of the last point of the SID En-route Transition
- STAR En-route Transitions do not require a designator as they are identified by the name of the first point of the STAR En-route Transition
- The single term "Transition" or the terms "RNAV Transition" or "RNP Transition" should not be used to designate (elements of) SID/STAR or Approach procedures

2.3. Proposed amendments to PANS — Aircraft Operations (Doc 8168), Volumes I - Flight procedures and III - Aircraft operating procedures, for RPAS operations

2.3.1. FLTOPSP noted that the implementation of international RPAS operations and the development of Annex 6, Part IV need amendments to various ICAO documents to ensure consistency and continuity with proposed SARPs and to support seamless integration. The RPAS Panel was tasked with providing RPAS-related amendments to PANS-OPS.

2.4. Risks related to altimeter setting errors during APV Baro-VNAV and non-precision approach operations

2.4.1. During its session in November/December 2022, the EAPSG has taken Decision 4/14 – Development of a Regional Bulletin on Baro-VNAV Approaches: "That the EASPG PBNC TF be tasked to develop a draft ICAO EUR OPS Bulletin with a view to sensitizing in 2023 the EUR aviation community to vulnerabilities of Baro-VNAV approaches, in particular their dependence on correct altimeter setting."

2.4.2. To better manage the risks related to altimeter setting errors, in particular during APV Baro-VNAV and non-precision approach operations, a proposed amendment was that it is recommended to aircraft operators, IFR pilots and air traffic service providers (ATC and AFIS):

- to ensure that awareness of the risk of altimeter setting errors and their consequences is shared;

- to assess the robustness of the above barriers, and to consider implementing mitigation measures, when relevant;

- to report all situations that have generated deviations in order to improve the visibility of this type of event with a view to appropriate treatment;

- to contribute collectively to training on this risk, to disseminate best practices and to promote exchanges between domains in order to better understand the limits of the systems.

- For aircraft operators, to investigate methods to identify incorrect altimeter setting with the FDM Program.

2.5. Adequacy of the available visual aids to establish aerodrome operating minima

2.5.1. Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) strongly improves flight on-time performance, flight regularity, airport accessibility and flight safety and therefore EFVS operations have developed a lot.

2.5.2. However, questions were raised within the Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel (ADOP) in recent years regarding the incompatibility between LED technology and some enhanced vision systems such as Night Vision Goggles (NVG) and EFVS.

2.6. Update on GNSS Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) mitigation efforts

2.6.1. Eurocontrol and Airbus have provided some studies about the GNSS outages and the implications with flight operations.

2.6.2. Frequent problems associated with GNSS outages are:

- failure of one or both GPS boxes,
- disagreement between GPS positions and NAV FMSs,
- inability to fly RNP and request for radar vectoring,
- wrong wind and ground speed presentations,
- loss of ADS B, aircraft clocks L/R/both failed or began to count backwards,
- terrain warnings,
- pull-up requests.

2.6.3. The Ground Requirements have been set according to the 2014 "Preparation for EU PBN Implementing Rule":

• ATC Human in the Loop Impact Studies for impact assessment including GPS Loss,

• Budapest simulation, high level of "GPS only for PBN" traffic (20%),

• ATCO Statement: "I can deal with GPS RFI, just tell me when it starts, how many sectors are affected, and when it ends",

• Validated OPS Requirement through EUROCONTROL NETOPS.

2.6.4. The NETOPS agreed to some recommendations. Among others, the operational need



to be aware of the geographic area of GPS outages and that ATC intend to use this information in the context of contingency operations.

2.6.5. On-ground problems which might arise are:

1. Loss of some surveillance capabilities (ADS B, ADS C),

- 2. Possible loss of CPDLC,
- 3. ATC workload increase.

EVAIR – GNSS outages reports



2.6.6. There has been some discussion about security aspects like the possibility of GNSS Spoofing.

2.7. Proposed amendment for Annex 6, Part I regarding operator emergency response plans (ERP)

2.7.1. Following an initial proposal in 2021, the Panel conducted a review of operator requirements for emergency response planning, resulting in a proposal to amend Annex 6, Part I.

2.7.2. Proposal to include testing of the ERP was made. There are provisions in Annex 14 for the Aerodrome emergency plan to be periodically tested, therefore this could be considered for the ERP. I suggested to include the need to carry simulations from time-to-time so operators would become used to it.

2.8. Draft Proposal for Amendment to PANS-ATM and associated guidance material to Support the Standardization of Operational Trials

2.8.1. The 39th Assembly Session of the Technical Commission, highlighted the value of operational trials in the successful implementation of new ATM procedures, and subsequently the technical commission supported the action proposed. The FLTOPSP provided a paper containing a draft PANS-ATM (Doc 4444) amendment and associated guidance material for the standardization and conduct of operational trials.

2.8.2. The purpose of the proposed guidance material is to assist in the planning and conduct of operational trials by providing the framework to support robust planning, stakeholder communication and trial conduct, and as a basis for States, ANSPs, and/or ICAO Regions to utilize the outcomes of operational trials conducted by others. All this should be planned and conducted in accordance with appropriate safety risk management policies and procedures.

1 PANS-ATM PROVISIONS

This document addresses the implementation of the following provisions regarding the conduct 1.1 of operational trials introduced into the PANS-ATM by amendment xx Chapter 2 **ATS Safety Management** ... 2.8 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONAL TRIALS 2.8.1 Operational trials demonstrate a practice, acquire operational performance data, expose participants to changes in operation, and/or test the viability of one or more systems that are critical to a new ATM procedure. The conduct and implementation of such trials should be coordinated with all relevant stakeholders, including, but not limited to: air navigation services providers, aircraft operators, and the appropriate ATS authorities. The scope of the trial may necessitate regional or inter-regional coordination. Information relating to an operational trial should be made available to all relevant stakeholders 282 and address, as a minimum, the following: a) a concept of operations addressing the scope, objectives and conduct of the trial, including detailed descriptions of the proposed changes; b) safety management activities; c) training and participation requirements; andd) notifications, communications and reporting. Note.— Detailed guidance on the specific activities, documentation and responsibilities related to these requirements is contained in Guidance for Planning, Preparation and Conduct of Operational Trials. (Doc XXXX).

2.9. Baro VNAV

2.9.1. PANS-OPS and the RNP AR Manual require a publication of the temperature at which an effective Vertical Path Angle (VPA) of 3.5° (instead of the standard 3° VPA) is reached. States take that literally and this results in absurd temperatures being published that are not useful to crews. The FLTOPS was thus tasked to coordinate and regulate the issue with the IFPP.

2.9.2. A paper was also presented to consider the issues related to incorrect altimeter settings in case of baro-VNAV procedures. ICAO, Airbus and EASA issued Safety bulletins on the topic. The picture below shows there are procedures affected by wrong altimeter setting while others are not.

Non-Precision Approach		APV Approach with Vertical Guidance		Precision Approach		
Conventional Navigation	PBN RNP APCH	PBN RNP APCH / RNP AR APCH	PBN RNP APCH		GBAS	Conventional Navigation
VOR - VOR/DME NDB - NDB/DME LOC – LOC/DME	NPA GNSS	APV Baro-VNAV	APV SBAS	SBAS CAT I		ILS
	LNAV	LNAV/VNAV	LPV		GLS	PAR
Operated in 2D or 3D (with the use of Baro-VNAV)			Necessarily operated in 3D			
Vertical profile impacted by altimeter setting!			Vertical profile not impacted by altimeter setting			

2.9.3. The EASA representative stated it is the European Commission intention to get rid of all CAT I ILS by (or from) 2030 to allow a strong development of GNSS procedures. This statement brought the Boeing representative to express his concerns as it's been demonstrated how GNSS, being weak on spoofing and jamming attacks, is not as reliable as the ILS.

2.10. RPAS Task Force on Interceptions (RPASTF-I)

2.10.1. The FLTOPSP was mad aware the RPAS Panel identified that the interception by military/state aircraft of a civil unmanned aircraft is a transversal issue, consequently, the establishment of an RPASP Task Force Interceptions (RPASTF-I) was agreed as the most appropriate way to facilitate a multi-disciplinary approach to this issue.

2.10.2.Many topics have been arranged except the case of the pilot-in-command of a civil aircraft that, when intercepted, should respond to visual signals sent by the intercepting aircraft. How could it be done by remote pilots? And how does RPA Pilot response in case of Communication and Control (C2) link loss, especially considering that the Detect And Avoid (DAA) system might initiate self-manoeuvre to avoid the intercepting aircraft?

2.10.3. My point was if it would be feasible to mandate RPAS to carry a communication device with very limited range, like a Bluetooth device, that could connect only to intercepting aircraft which are very close to the RPAS, and that's designed to disable DAA and, maybe, take control of the RPAS.

2.10.4. The presenter told they thought about it, but that the topic carries considerations about new regulation for military intercepting aircraft which is out of the scope of the ICAO activities (civil regulation only).

2.11. Proposal on SARPs about Ground Handling in Annex 6 Part I, II & III

2.11.1.The initial request from the ANC for ground handling requirements came from the growing concern from States about the continued high numbers of accidents and incidents affecting aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure.

2.11.2. The Ground Handling Task Force (GHTF) of the Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel (ADOP) was initially tasked in June 2015 to develop 'best practice material' in the form of an ICAO Manual and following this to consider the development of SARPs for ground handling in several ICAO Annexes.

2.11.3. The proposed modification in Annex 6, Part I aims to better clarify and include the responsibilities of aircraft operators in ensuring safe and efficient ground handling operations. Additional provisions related to ground handling are being introduced in Annex 14, Vol I and PANS Aerodromes, to provide an effective package on ground handling.

CHAPTER 1.1 DEFINITIONS

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Ground handling. Services necessary for an aircraft's arrival at, and departure from, an airport, other than air traffic services.

2.11.4. I asked to share the document with the ATMOPSP as I don't like the definition itself. Saying that Ground handling is a "service necessary for an aircraft... ...other than air traffic services", means there are only two available services: ATS and ground handling, and I'm not so sure about it. To my opinion the definition is too broad.

2.12. GADSS End of Flight (EoF) Proposed amendment to ICAO Doc 10165

2.12.1. The FLTOPSP End of Flight (EoF) Sub-group reviewed the Standards relating to the accurate and timely determination of the location of the end of flight. This work has resulted in a proposal for an amendment of current Standards to be introduced in Annex 6, Part I to ensure efficient SAR operations.

2.12.2. The amendment proposal of Annex 6 Part I was presented to the ANC last spring and the ICAO secretariat suggested few editorial corrections that have been coordinated with the EoF Sub-group and accepted by the Commission.

2.12.3. The new proposal changed, among others, all the nouns "accident" into "crash". I stated "crash" is related to catastrophic events while the ELT can be manually activated by pilots e.g., when safely land on a remote area field, without actually crashing, with no other way to communicate rather than the ELT itself. Thus, the Panel agreed to cancel the nouns and do a complete rework on the document.

2.13. Volcanic Ash update / Quantitative Volcanic Ash


2.13.1. Following requests from the aviation industry to know how much volcanic ash is really present in the air, quantitative forecasts of volcanic ash are being developed to be provided to users in the coming years. These new forecasts are referred to as Quantitative Volcanic Ash (QVA).

2.13.2.QVA information offers operators use certified engine susceptibility for flight route planning and inflight replanning rather than the usual discernible/visible ash criteria and will be provided in two file formats:

• Objects will be provided in ICAO's Meteorological Information Exchange Model (IWXXM) format.

• Gridded data will be provided in a file format which has yet to be determined but will probably be a binary format.

2.13.3.QVA information in gridded code format will include ensemble relative frequency of exceedance for volcanic ash concentration thresholds of 0.2, 2, 5 and 10 mg/m³.



2.14. Extended Minimum-Crew Operations (eMCO)

2.14.1. The International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA) presented a paper on Extended Minimum-Crew Operations (eMCO) about the recent progress made in cockpit design, automation and monitoring systems that has improved safety and

operational efficiency to enhance the assistance provided to the flight crew. These technologies together with operational procedures and crew training, support new dedicated resting possibilities in cruise to address fatigue issues in international commercial air transport with large aeroplanes.

2.14.2. The new concept of eMCO aims at allowing one pilot at the controls in cruise in commercial air transport with large aeroplanes. As such, it shall be distinguished from end-to-end single pilot operations.

2.14.3.A safe and harmonized implementation of eMCO requires a review of the relevant ICAO SARPs, particularly the Annex 6, as well as the development of guidance.

2.14.4. The paper presented a line saying: "This global safety objective will be demonstrated through the combined contributions of......The demonstration of compatibility of eMCO with the existing ATM/ATC environment."

2.14.5.I asked how this concept needs to be compatible with ATC, as to us, what happens in the cockpit should be transparent. The presenter answered they are thinking about the fact that ATC would not be affected at all, but also that possibly they'll set the requirement to inform ATC in case of single pilot operation in place.

2.14.6. This because in case of the pilot resting is not coming back when the operational pilot gets incapacitated, we should know to be more aware. I presented my concerns about these considerations. A well as IFALPA representatives did.

2.15. Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Disruption Operations' Standards

2.15.1. Aviation worldwide recognizes the reliance on PBN operations that require accurate and dependable space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services delivered by GNSS. Disruptions to GNSS result in inefficiency, financial losses, and compromised safety.

2.15.2.Due to the increasing frequency of GNSS disruption events around the globe, it is necessary to provide operational guidance and procedures that:

• Identify recommendations to ensure the safe and efficient recovery/continuity of aircraft operations during a GNSS disruption event.

• Improve timely information exchange (voice, data) between ANSPs, operators, and other aviation stakeholders.

• Harmonize alignment of State and ICAO procedures when encountering a GNSS disruption event.

2.15.3. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is currently reviewing/updating GPS disruption procedures and operational concepts, to include detection, mitigation, communication, and response actions.

2.15.4.ICAO's GNSS Manual (Doc 9849) contains information on vulnerabilities, yet there are currently no existing worldwide standards for how to handle GNSS disruptions from an operator's perspective.

2.15.5.This manual is currently under review within the Navigation Systems Panel, with an update expected in 2024.

2.16. All Weather Operations (AWO) update / PBAOM

2.16.1.The AWO Manual was supposed to be applicable in June 2022 but has not been published yet. The SG is arranging to update 9 Annexes and 7 PANS by FLTOPSP/11 (end 2024) to lead the Manual to the phase II by 2025.

2.16.2.In the meanwhile, the PBAOM proposal received no comments from the inter-panel coordination.


2.16.3.As a reminder, the PBAOM is a concept to enable advanced aircraft (equipped with EFVS) to fly a CAT I approach procedure with lower minima than CAT I itself. This concept might become useless if the CAT I ILS will be dismissed.

2.17. Adequacy of the available visual aids to establish aerodrome operating minima

2.17.1.Electronic Flight Vision System (EFVS) include imaging sensors, most of which are based on forward-looking infrared (FLIR). The LED technology, which has been spreading worldwide on aerodromes, including for approach lighting system, does not emit Infra-Red (IR) rays.

2.17.2. There is therefore a growing concern for the aircraft industry (both aircraft manufacturers and aircraft operators) about the incompatibility between some EFVS and LED approach lighting.

2.17.3. The FLTOPSP is proposing to amend some ICAO provisions regarding ground lighting like the information about the type of lights to be reported on the AIPs.



2.18. Update on runway definitions developed by the Runway Classification Group (RCG)

2.18.1. The Runway Classification Group (RCG) is a multi-disciplinary group created from participants to the Aerodrome Operations Panel (ADOP), Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP), and Instrument Flight Procedures Panel (IFPP).

2.18.2.In its current form, the definition of non-instrument runways allows all instrument approaches that can be continued in visual meteorological conditions past a 'point' which is not further specified.

2.18.3. The fact that a reference to visual and non-visual aids only exists in the definition for instrument runways could lead to the assumption, that if any kind of runway is served by visual and/or non-visual aids, this runway automatically must be considered as an instrument runway.

2.18.4.Provided that, the following amendments to the standard definitions have been proposed:

Instrument runway. One of the following types of runways intended to support intended for the operation of the basic aircraft using instrument approach procedures:

a) Non-precision approach runway. A runway served by visual aids and non-visual aid(s) intended to support intended for landing operations following an instrument approach operations with DH/MDH not lower than 75 m (250 feet) type A and a visibility not less than 1 000 m.

b) Precision approach runway, category I. A runway served by visual aids and non-visual aid(s) intended to support intended for landing operations following an instrument approach operations type B with a decision height (DH) not lower than 60 m (200 ft) and either a visibility not less than 800 m or a runway visual range not less than 550 m.

c) Precision approach runway, category II. A runway served by visual aids and nonvisual aid(s) intended to support intended for landing operations following an instrument approach operation type B with a decision height (DH) lower than 60 m (200 ft) but not lower than 30 m (100 ft) and a runway visual range not less than 300 m.

d) Precision approach runway, category III. A runway served by visual aids and nonvisual aid(s) intended to support intended for landing operations following an instrument approach operation type B with a decision height (DH) lower than 30 m (100 ft), or no decision height and a runway visual range less than 300 m, or no runway visual range limitations.

Note 1.— Visual aids need not necessarily be matched to the scale of non-visual aids provided. The criterion for the selection of visual aids is the conditions in which operations are intended to be conducted.

Note 2.— Refer to Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft for instrument approach operation types.

Note 3.— Advanced aircraft may use different DH/MDH and RVR without implications to the runway classifications. *Non-instrument runway.* A runway, served by visual aids and if provided non-visual aids intended to support for the the operations of basic aircraft using solely visual references approach procedures or an instrument approach procedures with DH/MDH not lower than the OCH for circling approaches. to a point beyond which the approach and landing may continue in visual meteorological conditions

Note 1.— The lower limit of OCH for circling approaches is described in Table I-4-7-3 of Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS, Doc 8168) and Table 6-2 of Manual of All-Weather Operations (Doc 9365).

Note 2.— Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) are described in Chapter 3 of Annex 2 Rules of the Air. Advanced aircraft may use different MDH/DH without implications to the runway classification.

2.19. Draft Proposal for Amendment to PANS-ATM for the 2 NM level flight requirement for independent parallel approaches

2.19.1.Mr. David Perks from IFATCA has become the SASP Chairman. During the last FLTOPSP meeting he presented the paper on a proposal to delete that part of PANS ATM which prescribes have a 2 NM levelled flight before intercepting the GP from below after being vectored for independent parallel runway approach.

2.19.2. The Panel agreed on the concept and proposed a timeframe for deliberation.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1. There are rumors on the intention (at least in Europe) to shut down ILS CAT I in 2030 in favor of GNSS procedure. There might be the need for future IFATCA policies.

3.2. The aviation community interest in using RNAV, GNSS, Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) and other modern means of navigation in lieu of conventional radionavigational aids or to operate beyond existing minima is interesting indeed from ATM point of view either, but some ATC issues haven't been resolved yet.

3.3. The RPAS interception seems to be an unresolvable topic. There's not much interest from industry in developing really large, unmanned aircraft for international activities yet still there might be in the future.

3.4. The industry is working on the Single Pilot Operations, even for time being only in certain limited and defined framework. Saying that their intention is to permit more pilot relief sounds strange and requires monitoring over the ATC related issues.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that this report be accepted as information paper.

-=END=-